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Restrictive State and Local Immigration Laws: 
Solutions in Search of Problems 
 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram* & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan** 
 
I. Introduction 
 
In its 2012 Arizona v. United States decision, the Supreme Court mostly struck down 
Arizona’s unilateral attempt to create and enforce its own immigration enforcement scheme, 
intended to diminish the undocumented immigrant population within the state, and presumably 
the nation as well. Nevertheless, one important provision of the state law—directing state and 
local law enforcement officers to check the immigration status of those whom they stop, arrest, 
or detain—survived the Court’s review and is now in effect. This outcome, both in what was 
enjoined and what was not, is significant for the field of immigration federalism. Similar cases 
from Alabama and Georgia will likely be appealed to the Supreme Court, and the laws of several 
local jurisdictions will be affected by Arizona and pending federal court cases. While a majority 
of the Court reaffirmed federal supremacy in the field of immigration, it also continued the 
process of carving out areas of appropriate subfederal, i.e. state and local, participation. The 
Arizona dissents viewed state power even more expansively, including one opinion suggesting 
that states had the inherent authority to expel unwanted persons from within their borders. 
 
An important, yet overlooked, aspect of the case is the factual assumptions about 
unlawful migration, and the public policy challenges caused by such migration, proffered by 
both the majority and dissenting opinions. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, noted “the 
pervasiveness of federal regulation does not diminish the importance of immigration policy to 
the States. Arizona bears many of the consequences of unlawful immigration.” While he did not 
specify what those consequences are, Justice Scalia’s dissent was much more explicit: 
 
Arizona bears the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration 
problem. Its citizens feel themselves under siege by large numbers 
of illegal immigrants who invade their property, strain their social 
services, and even place their lives in jeopardy. Federal officials 
have been unable to remedy the problem, and indeed have recently 
shown that they are unwilling to do so.1 
 
Notably, despite relying on these specific factual claims about the effects of unlawful migration, 
Scalia neglected to provide sources for these seemingly crucial truths. Judge Posner of the 
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The ideas presented in this Issue Brief are developed in detail in Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The New 
Immigration Federalism (awaiting submission, draft on file with authors) (forthcoming 2013), from which we have 
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1
 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2522 (Scalia, J. dissenting). 
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Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals took Justice Scalia to task for this omission, arguing that such 
assertions are “sufficiently inflammatory to call for a citation to some reputable source of such 
hyperbole. Justice Scalia cites nothing to support it.”2 
 
Instead of verifying his claims, Scalia relied on the intuitive and seemingly common-
sense proposition that demographic changes have been driving Arizona’s immigration policies. 
By extension then, we might also believe that other states that have enacted similar laws – like 
Alabama, Georgia, Indiana, and Utah– are justifiably and necessarily forced to act. Indeed, 
Scalia’s sympathy for the plight of helpless states directly informs his implausible vision of a 
constitutional order in which states can create their own immigration laws. He, however, is not 
alone in believing that demographic changes and their attendant policy challenges galvanize and 
justify subfederal immigration lawmaking. Indeed, many elected officials, advocates, and even 
scholars have viewed the geographic spread of immigrants, and the geographic spread of 
restrictive legislation on immigration as intimately linked. For example, Lou Barletta, mayor of a 
small city in central Pennsylvania that was among the earliest to pass a restrictive ordinance, 
testified to Congress that “[i]n Hazelton, illegal immigration is not some abstract debate about 
walls and amnesty, but it is a tangible, very real problem.”3 Immigration scholars, while mostly 
declining to endorse state and local enforcement schemes, have also assumed the salience of 
these factors in accounting for the rise of state and local immigration laws.4 And, many media 
reports have also invoked this same wisdom, of immigration-induced changes leading inexorably 
to policy pressures and legislative action at the local level.5  
 
Because of the pervasiveness of this demography-based explanation, we sought to verify 
the importance of migration shifts and policy problems in the rise of state and local responses. 
We empirically tested the rationales proffered to support such laws, to wit, increased recent 
immigration, economic stress, and language isolation. Surprisingly, our analysis revealed that 
demographic factors associated with new immigration and attendant policy challenges are 
neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for state and local immigration laws. That is to say, 
there are thousands of jurisdictions where demographic change does not lead to ordinance 
                                                        
2
 Richard A. Posner, Justice Scalia is Upset about Illegal Immigration. But Where is His Evidence?, SLATE, June 27, 
2012, 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/2012/_supreme_court_year_in_review
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3
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4
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non-citizens.”); Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
567, 609 (2008) (maintaining that the demographic shifts caused by globalization and immigration “are felt 
differently in different parts of the country, and the disruption immigration causes, as well as the viability of 
different immigration strategies, will vary....”). 
5
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activity and there are many jurisdictions where restrictive legislation has been passed in the 
absence of significant local demographic pressures. Admittedly, necessary and sufficient 
conditions constitute a high bar for empirical verification, as outlier cases can invalidate claims 
using this deterministic approach. Even adopting a probabilistic approach and running 
multivariate regressions on state and municipal legislative activity, we find that demographic 
changes and their attendant policy challenges have no predictive power. Thus, the primary 
justifications undergirding most scholarly, political, and judicial explanations for this recent 
spate of state and local immigration regulations have little empirical support. 
 
So, if immigration-induced demographic change does not explain this recent spate of 
state and local immigration laws, what does? The answer, not coincidentally, returns to where we 
started. Beyond its unsupported factual claims, commentators criticized Scalia’s Arizona dissent 
for stepping outside the proper bounds of judicial temperament, and for its overtly partisan 
rhetoric. Scalia earned these scathing reviews in large part because of his conspicuous evaluation 
of the Obama Administration’s recent policy decision to defer deportation prosecution for young, 
law-abiding undocumented students. This policy was announced two weeks after oral arguments 
in Arizona and is nowhere in the record or judicial documents relevant to the case. While oddly 
placed in a judicial opinion, the overtly political flavor of Scalia’s dissent is symptomatic of a 
deeper change in immigration law and policy over the past three decades. Past Presidents like 
Ronald Reagan and Bill Clinton mustered bipartisan support for their federal immigration 
overhauls in 1986 and 1996, respectively. Since 2001, however, immigration has increasingly 
polarized along party lines, with determined and cohesive party-line votes blocking passage of 
widely-supported comprehensive federal overhaul efforts and very popular stand-alone bills like 
the DREAM Act.6 
 
The role of partisanship and political maneuvering in advancing restrictive legislation is 
evident not only at the national level, but also at the state and local levels. What most subfederal 
jurisdictions with immigration enforcement laws share is not economic stress or 
overconsumption of public goods or heightened violent crime, but rather a partisan composition 
within their legislative and executive branches that is highly receptive to enforcement heavy 
proposals. Indeed, our nationwide study of 50 states and over 25,000 local jurisdictions, revealed 
that – after controlling for the demographic factors – political affiliation was the most important 
and significant factor in explaining the proposal and passage of these laws. These highly partisan 
contexts, in turn, serve as fertile ground for external issue entrepreneurs, such as the Immigration 
Reform Law Institute (IRLI) and Kansas Secretary of State Kris W. Kobach, who offer 
restrictive laws as pre-packaged solutions in search of immigration problems. 
 
This Issue Brief briefly presents the data and conclusions from our empirical study of 
state and local immigration laws, and then considers some of the potential implications of these 
conclusions. It seeks to showcase the importance of partisanship in explaining the spread of state 
                                                        
6
 Among other things, the Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors, or “DREAM,” Act would provide 
legal status for certain undocumented youth. For more information, see The DREAM Act: A Resource Page, 
IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER (Sep. 16, 2010), http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/dream-act-resource-
page; Americans Agree: Protecting DREAMERS is a No-Brainer, AMERICA’S VOICE ONLINE (June 2012), 
http://americasvoiceonline.org/polls/americans-agree-protecting-dreamers-is-a-no-brainer/.  
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and local laws, while discounting the conventional wisdom that these enactments are organic 
policy responses to pressing demographic needs. It cautions that judicial opinions, legal theories, 
and political rhetoric based on these commonly-held assumptions must be reconsidered. 
 
II. The Empirical Validity of Demographic Explanations for State and Local Immigration 
Regulation 
 
Recently, states and localities have renewed their interest in immigration regulation. The 
National Council of State Legislatures reports over 7,000 state immigration proposals over the 
last five years.
7
 States and localities are increasingly considering and passing laws that create 
state immigration crimes, enact state immigration enforcement schemes, regulate the renting of 
property to certain non-citizens, penalize businesses for hiring unauthorized workers, and 
discriminate in the provision of public services. In most instances, the stated aim of this 
restrictive legislation is to discourage entry or residence of unauthorized immigrants, or what 
many restrictionists have called “attrition through enforcement.”8  
 
Our purpose in this section is to explore why subnational governments have vigorously 
reentered the field of immigration regulation, testing widely held assumptions regarding this 
question. More specifically, we ask: Why do some places in the United States adopt restrictive 
legislation while others adopt more permissive legislation? We focus on this question because if 
states and localities are responding to objectively measurable policy challenges, we would expect 
that other jurisdictions facing similar population changes and concerns would be likely to 
consider and replicate these legislative solutions.9 We answer the question as it involves state 
laws and local ordinances, and we analyze corresponding sets of legislative data: a collection of 
state legislation and local ordinance information from 2005-2010.
10
 In analyzing this data, our 
goal is to determine the relative importance and weight of several factors that have been 
proffered by commentators and elected representatives to explain the recent spate of subnational 
lawmaking. These commonly accepted explanations comprise what we term the “conventional” 
theory or model of subnational immigration regulation. 
 
A. The Conventional Explanation for State and Local Laws 
 
The conventional explanation for the recent spate of state and local laws should be 
familiar to anyone paying attention to immigration policy. It holds that the policy stalemate at the 
federal level, combined with the pressure created by the public policy challenges of recent and 
rapid demographic changes, compel states and localities to legislate in a field they would rather 
                                                        
7
 BROOKE MEYER & ANN MORSE, 2011 IMMIGRATION-RELATED LAWS AND RESOLUTIONS IN THE STATES (JAN. 1–
DEC. 7, 2011), NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATORS, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/immig/state-
immigration-legislation-report-dec-2011.aspx.  
8
 S.B. 1070, 49th Leg., 2d Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2010) (explicitly invoking this frame in Section 1 of the law: “The 
legislature declares that the intent of this act is to make attrition through enforcement the public policy of all state 
and local government agencies in Arizona.”), available at http://www.azleg.gov/legtext/49leg/2r/bills/sb1070s.pdf. 
9
 See, e.g., Cristina M. Rodríguez, Significance of the Local, supra note 4, at 609. 
10
 A prior version of the research in this section appears in S. Karthick Ramakrishnan & Tom Wong, Partisanship, 
Not Spanish: Explaining Municipal Ordinances Affecting Undocumented Immigrants, in TAKING LOCAL CONTROL: 
IMMIGRATION POLICY ACTIVISM IN U.S. CITIES AND STATES (Monica Varsanyi, ed. 2011). 
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avoid, but now have no choice but to enter. In this explanation, federal inaction and subfederal 
activity are independent phenomena, unconnected both theoretically and descriptively – federal 
inaction simply happens, and that pre-existing fact serves as the starting point for analysis. 
Accordingly, state and local lawmaking is framed as a necessary response, occasioned by 
objectively understood, unique public policy challenges faced by particular jurisdictions.11  
 
This sentiment was neatly encapsulated by Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona in her 
signing statement accompanying the passage of S.B. 1070, which created a state immigration 
enforcement scheme and provided state criminal penalties for immigration violations: 
 
The bill I’m about to sign into law – Senate Bill 1070 – represents 
another tool for our state to use as we work to solve a crisis we did 
not create and the federal government has refused to fix…. The 
crisis caused by illegal immigration and Arizona’s porous border.12 
 
The City of Valley Park, Missouri also highlights specific problems purportedly caused by 
unlawful immigrants:  
 
[I]llegal immigration leads to higher crime rates, subjects our 
hospitals to fiscal hardship and our residents to substandard quality 
of care, contributes to other burdens on public services, increasing 
their costs and diminishing their availability, diminishes our 
overall quality of life, and endangers the security and safety of the 
homeland.
13
 
 
The chief virtue of this conventional explanation is its simplicity and intuitive appeal; in 
other words, it just seems right. In addition to the widespread acceptance that immigration policy 
has reached a stalemate at the national level, it also makes intuitive sense that rapid migration 
and demographic change are causing significant social dislocation and prompting redistribution 
of some public goods. In addition, current economic study suggests that the fiscal benefits of 
immigration are more likely to be concentrated at the national level, while any short-term fiscal 
costs are more likely to be borne by specific localities, particularly with respect to the provision 
of public education, social services, and emergency room care.
14
 Similarly, news stories have 
devoted extensive coverage of complaints by state and local government officials over 
overcrowded housing, schools, and emergency rooms.
15
 And, it is evident that immigrants in 
                                                        
11
 Cristina M. Rodríguez, Significance of the Local, supra note 4 at 575 (discussing the “familiar rhetoric” of federal 
failure as the justification of state and local involvement). 
12
 Press Release, Arizona Governor Jan Brewer, Statement by Governor Brewer on the signing of Senate Bill 1070 
(Apr. 23, 2010), http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/PR_042310_StatementByGovernorOnSB1070.pdf.  
13
 Valley Park, Mo., Ordinance 1722, § 1 C (2008) (stating purpose of city’s illegal immigrant employment and 
rental law). See also, H.B. 56 § 2, 2011 Reg. Sess, (Ala. 2011) (“the State of Alabama finds that illegal immigration 
is causing economic hardship and lawlessness.”). 
14
 NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL EFFECTS OF 
IMMIGRATION 254-296, (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., 1997). 
15
 See Lou Dobbs Tonight: Broken Borders (CNN television broadcast May 2, 2007); See also Alex Kotlowitz, Our 
Town, supra note 5. 
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recent years have been moving to “new destinations”—areas with little or no history of 
immigrant settlement in the past century.
16
 The emergence of these new destinations augments 
the narrative of rapid, recent demographic change that many assume to cause state and local 
legislative reactions. Despite the several appealing aspects to this model of demographically-
induced legislative action, upon closer evidentiary analysis, this model does not hold. 
 
B. Empirically Testing the Conventional Model 
 
1. Hypothesized Factors Necessitating State and Local Response 
 
Using our original data set of about 25,000 localities,
17
 we tested the importance of the 
following factors hypothesized to contribute to the proposal or passage of subnational 
immigration regulation: 
 
 Population of New Immigrants, and Growth of Latino and Foreign-Born Populations 18 
 
 High Proportions of Linguistically-Isolated Households 
 
 Overcrowded Housing 
 
 Latino Share and Naturalized Share of the Citizen Population 
 
 Economic Stress and Relative Group Deprivation 
 
 State-Level Policy Climate 
 
 Local Economic Interests 
 
 Party Composition of the Electorate 
 
                                                        
16
 These so-called “new destinations” include places ranging from rural Kansas and North Carolina to suburbs in 
Long Island and Georgia that have had little recent history of immigration. TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY GATEWAYS: 
IMMIGRANT INCORPORATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA (Brookings Institution Press, Audrey Singer, Susan Wiley 
Hardwick & Caroline Brettell, eds., 2008). 
17
 Our information on restrictive activity at the municipal level is based on lists collected by various legal defense 
organizations and validated by making phone calls to jurisdictions noted as considering or passing ordinances, as 
well as by monitoring news stories on local ordinances. We merged information on the proposal and passage of 
ordinances with census data from the larger universe of over 25,000 localities (municipalities, villages, and places). 
We use the shorthand “cities” to refer to these types of government, to contrast them with county governments. At 
the state level, two graduate student research assistants coded legislative summaries provided by the National 
Conference of State Legislatures based on their topic, valence, and severity.  
18
 We use “recent immigrants” as a proxy measure for the likelihood of a high unauthorized migrant population. It is 
not possible to attain accurate data on numbers of unauthorized migrants in most localities, but we expect recent 
immigrants to be composed of a high percentage of unauthorized migrants. In addition, using this broader 
description accounts for the “new destinations” trope in current restrictionist discourse. 
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Immigrant criminality or increase in crime-rate could also be added as a hypothesized 
demographic factor causing state and local response. However, we do not independently test that 
hypothesis with our data set, and thus do not include it in our list of hypothesized and tested 
factors. Instead, we rely on the substantial empirical work already completed in this area by 
social scientists. They have proven that increased immigrant criminality is a “myth,” with lower 
incarceration rates amongst recent immigrants than the native-born population. 19  Further, in 
many jurisdictions passing restrictive ordinances, overall crime and violent crime have decreased 
in the past several years, in the same time span that the demographic problems purportedly 
caused by undocumented immigrants have captured state and local attention.20  
 
Finally, while the presence or absence of prior state legislation is a potentially important 
factor in explaining municipal ordinance activity on immigration, it is also important to explain 
what factors, if any, explain restrictive laws at the state level. Many of the factors that we 
hypothesize to predict local legislative activity are also relevant for state activity, albeit at a 
different scale. Thus, we are able to obtain measures of the population of new immigrants, the 
growth of Latino and foreign-born populations, and the unemployment rates of whites and blacks 
at the state level.  
 
2. Data and Statistical Findings21 
 
a. Cities 
 
In our dataset of over 25,000 cities across the United States, from May 2006 to December 
2011, 125 had proposed restrictive ordinances and 93 had proposed pro-immigrant ordinances, 
including measures limiting cooperation with federal authorities on deportations. 22  On the 
restrictionist side, approximately 63 percent of proposals had passed, about 12 percent had been 
voted down or tabled, and a quarter were still pending. On the “pro” side, the vast majority of 
proposals had passed, with only two pending and one classified as failed or tabled.  
                                                        
19
 See RUBEN G. RUMBAUT AND WALTER A. EWING, IMMIGRATION POLICY CENTER, SPECIAL REPORT, THE MYTH OF 
IMMIGRANT CRIMINALITY AND THE PARADOX OF ASSIMILATION: INCARCERATION RATES AMONG NATIVE AND 
FOREIGN BORN MEN 1-2 (Spring 2007). 
20
 Randal C. Archibold, On Border Violence, Truth Pales Compared to Ideas, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2010 (“the rate 
of violent crime at the border, and indeed across Arizona, has been declining, according to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation...”), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/20/us/20crime.html.  
21
 We have not included a full explanation of our data set, our statistical methods, and models here. Readers 
interested in reviewing the statistical work and analysis in greater detail may contact the authors (karthick@ucr.edu 
or pgulasekaram@scu.edu). In addition, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in 
Immigration Federalism, ARIZ. ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2012), contains a richer discussion of both the quantitiative 
and qualititative empirical work referenced herein. 
22
 The restrictive ordinances in our sample include measures whereby local governments use their official capacities 
to enforce federal immigration laws or to address perceived negative societal consequences of illegal immigration. 
Illegal Immigration Relief Act (IIRA) ordinances and variants of them constitute the majority of these restrictive 
measures. IIRAs commonly refer to the fiscal and governance challenges arising from the presence of illegal 
immigrants. The pro-immigrant ordinances in our sample include resolutions and mandates that express opposition 
to immigration raids and restrictionist national legislation, those barring the use of public funds to enforce 
immigration laws, and those with explicit “sanctuary” policies whereby local officials do not inquire about legal 
status and do not notify immigration authorities about the status of individuals unless they are convicted of serious 
crimes. 
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Cities with restrictive policies are but a small fraction of the thousands of communities in 
the United States that are transforming due to recent international migration. Among cities that 
passed restrictive ordinances, new immigrants averaged about 3 percent of the total resident 
population, slightly higher than the 1 percent average for cities across the country.
23
 This small 
difference in the proportion of new immigrants diminishes even further in significance when 
conducting a statistical analysis that controls for other explanatory factors.  
 
Even taking the case of a restrictionist city with the highest proportion of recent 
immigrants—Herndon, Virginia, where recent immigrants accounted for 14.5 percent of the 
town’s residents in 2000—we find that 129 other cities took no action, despite having even 
higher proportions of recent immigrants, including 23 with recent immigrants accounting for 
over 25 percent of the town’s residents. Indeed, the majority of jurisdictions that can claim to 
share the necessary demographic factors—such as growth in immigrant populations, having a 
recently-arrived immigrant population, or a high proportion of Spanish-speakers among 
immigrants—do not propose or pass immigrant-related laws.  
 
Even if immigration-induced change within a jurisdiction is insufficient, by itself, to 
provoke legislative response, might such change be a shared characteristic of enacting 
jurisdictions? We find that 29 out of the 79 localities that have passed restrictive ordinances (or 
37% of the cases) have recent immigrant populations that are below the national average for 
cities. Indeed, in a fifth of the cases (16 out of 79), recent immigrants accounted for fewer than 
0.5 percent of the city’s residents, and in these places the proportion of Spanish-dominant 
households was less than 3 percent of all households in the city. 
 
In order to arrive at more systematic answers about the conditions under which cities may 
consider and pass restrictive ordinances, we ran a multivariate regression that can show the 
contribution of each individual factor while controlling for all other factors.
24
 How do each of 
these potential explanations fare? 
 
Population of New Immigrants, and Growth of Latino and Foreign-Born Populations.   
Having an immigrant population that is composed primarily of recent arrivals (or, having 
experienced a recent upsurge in Latino or immigrant populations) is not associated with 
restrictive ordinances. Indeed, it is associated with a greater likelihood of pro-immigrant 
legislation. Our alternative measure, of the growth of the foreign-born population between 1990 
                                                        
23
 These figures are means (averages). We use data from the 2000 Census, given missing data in the 2005-9 
American Community Survey file. The corresponding median figures are 1.72% for restrictive ordinance cities, and 
0.16% for cities in the nation as a whole.  
24
 Importantly, we remained attuned to issues of multicollinearity, where putting two factors that are closely related 
into the same explanatory model produces erratic results for those factors. Since some of these factors are highly 
correlated, we ran alternative model specifications instead of putting every factor in the same regression model. For 
full model results, see our working paper Pratheepan Gulasekaram & S. Karthick Ramakrishnan, The Importance of 
the Political in Immigration Federalism (unpublished manuscript), http://karthick.com/workingpapers_assets/GR-
submission-2-23.pdf. We used CLARIFY to simulate the effects on the dependent variable of changes in each 
individual variable while holding other variables at their means. See Michael Tomz, Jason Wittenberg & Gary King, 
CLARIFY: Software For Interpreting And Presenting Statistical Results, 8 J. OF STAT. SOFTWARE 1-30 (2003). 
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and 2000, or between 2000 and 2007, also has no statistically significant relationship with 
restrictive ordinance activity, although it is associated with a lower likelihood of pro-immigrant 
ordinances. Finally, a fast-growing Latino population in the locality, regardless of their 
citizenship and immigration status, is associated with a marginally greater likelihood of 
restrictive ordinances being proposed, but not passed. 
 
Linguistically-isolated Households & Overcrowded Housing. Factors related to recent 
arrivals, such as the proportion of households that are exclusively Spanish-speaking and the 
proportion of households that are overcrowded, also bore no relationship to the proposal or 
passage of restrictive ordinances up until 2007. Since then, however, the growth of Spanish-
speaking households has made a marginal difference in the probability of restrictive proposal and 
passage (increasing by 4% and 7%, respectively). These effects pale in comparison to those 
associated with local contexts of partisanship, discussed below. 
 
Latino share and naturalized share of the citizen population. We included these 
measures in two separate equations given their high level of collinearity. These factors do not 
bear any significant relationship to the proposal and passage of local ordinances, whether 
restrictive or permissive. This further reinforces findings from other studies of local immigrant 
incorporation that immigrant electoral power may be less important in predicting local 
government policies toward immigrants today than in the past.
25
  
 
Economic stress and relative group deprivation. There is no support for the contention 
that economic stress or relative deprivation (as measured by absolute or relative poverty rates, 
respectively) among white residents is related to the proposal or passage of restrictive legislation. 
Indeed, when relative measures of poverty are used, cities with whites who are relatively better 
off than Latinos are more likely to propose restrictive policies. However, when it comes to the 
passage of policies, there is no significant relationship. Finally, black relative deprivation is 
indeed associated with a higher likelihood of restrictive proposals, but not policy passage. It is 
unlikely that blacks are driving the proposal of restrictive legislation in most of these cities, since 
in none of these places are blacks the majority, and they are over a third of the population in only 
one case (Norristown, PA).  
 
State-level policy climate toward immigrants. This factor bears no significant 
relationship to ordinance activity at the local level. For state-local dynamics, neither the “steam 
valve” model (localities adversely reacting to state-level policy) nor the “demonstration effect” 
model (mimicking state level activity) are at play. 
 
Local economic interests. The prevalence of industrial sectors that are heavily dependent 
on immigrant workers is not significantly related to local ordinances, with one important 
exception: the likelihood of restrictive policies being passed is much lower in places where 
agriculture accounts for a sizable number of jobs. It is important to note, however, that the 
effects are evident in the stage of ordinance passage, but not ordinance proposal. This suggests 
                                                        
25
 S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN & PAUL G. LEWIS, IMMIGRANTS AND LOCAL GOVERNANCE: THE VIEW FROM CITY 
HALL, SAN FRANCISCO, CA: PUBLIC POLICY INSTITUTE OF CALIFORNIA (2005). 
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that policy entrepreneurs in agricultural areas may have overreached by pushing for restrictive 
policies only to find an organized opposition from local businesses to such plans.
26
 
  
Partisan composition. Among our hypothesized factors, partisanship has the strongest 
and most consistent effects. After controlling for all other factors, cities in Republican-majority 
areas are about 2.5 times more likely to propose restrictive ordinances, and they are about 4 
times as likely to pass such ordinances compared to Democratic-majority areas. By contrast, on 
the pro-immigrant side of enforcement, cities in Democratic-majority counties were about 4 
times as likely as those in Republican-majority areas to propose and pass such legislation. 
 
b. States 
 
During this same period, legislation at the state level was much more common, with 
1,321 laws enacted between 2005 and 2010. Of these, we coded 317 as restrictive, with at least 
one such law passed in 46 states. These laws ranged in terms of their policy area (e.g., education, 
law enforcement, public benefits) and in their severity (e.g., ranging from revoking licenses of 
notaries public who have been denaturalized, to laws denying access to state public benefits to 
unauthorized immigrants).
27
 Taking into consideration only those restrictive laws that we 
classified as having a significant impact on a state’s unauthorized immigrant resident 
population,
28
 the number of laws during this time period drops to 155, with Arizona passing the 
most laws (15), followed by Virginia (10), and Georgia (9).  
 
Illustrating again that demographic change is not sufficient to produce restrictionist 
legislation, of the top 25% of states where new immigrants make up a sizable portion of the 
overall population, only 6 of 13 states passed significant restrictive laws during this time. In the 
multivariate regressions, we test for several variations of demographic change, including the 
proportion of new immigrants, the proportional change in the foreign born population, and the 
absolute level of immigration in the area. On the other end of the demographic spectrum, we find 
that 9 of 12 states at the bottom quartile on this measure passed restrictive laws. Indeed, the 
passage of restrictive laws is highest for this bottom quartile of states, and lowest among the top 
quartile. Clearly demographic disruptions caused by recent immigration are also not necessary 
for state-level restrictive action. 
 
In our multivariate regression analysis that controls for various other factors, the state-
level models reveal no support for the hypothesis that restrictive legislation is more likely in 
states where immigrants have arrived recently, or alternatively, states with the biggest growth in 
the foreign-born population. Indeed, in some variations of our model, we find less restrictive 
activity in states with recent immigrant populations. For most of our demographic factors 
                                                        
26
 Cf. Michael Mintrom, Policy Entrepreneurs and the Diffusion of Innovation, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 738, 765 (1997) 
(noting the effects of strong union opposition). 
27
 2007 ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF 
STATE LEGISLATURES, 2-34 (rev. Jan. 31, 2008), http://www.ncsl.org/print/immig/2007Immigrationfinal.pdf.  
28
 The legislative summaries were coded on an ordinal scale of 1:“low impact” and 2:“high impact” on immigrant 
rights and/or access to benefits, based on the provision’s likely effects on immigrant life chances and the number of 
immigrants likely to be affected.  
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(including poverty rates and growth of the immigrant population), the findings are inconsistent, 
perhaps due to the small number of cases being analyzed (50 states). 
 
In the case of partisanship, however, the results are consistently significant. After 
controlling for various demographic factors, states with a majority of Republican voters have 
passed more than twice as many significant pieces of restrictive legislation (four, on average, 
during this period) as those states with a high proportion of Democratic voters (1.6, on average). 
Another way to look at the state results is to differentiate between those states with multiple 
pieces of significant restrictive legislation (three or more) versus the rest. Republican-majority 
states are nearly 300% more likely to be in this group than Democratic-majority states.
29
 Finally, 
we also update the analysis to account for laws enacted outside of the 2005-2010 period, by 
analyzing all current state laws on enforcement and work verification.
30
 Here, too, we find that 
partisanship has the strongest effect on the existence of restrictive state-level policies, and that 
factors such as the growth of the foreign-born population or the recency of the immigrant 
population do not matter. 
 
C. Partisanship and the Political Process 
 
To sum up, our analysis shows that the restrictive responses of local governments to 
undocumented immigration are largely unrelated to the objectively measurable demographic 
pressures credited in the conventional model of subnational immigration regulation. Our 
evidence discounts the saliency of recent immigrant population growth, the proportion of 
Spanish language-dominant households, and local economic and wage stress in the proposal and 
passage of such laws. These ordinances are also largely unrelated to the electoral empowerment 
of Latinos, given that places with large proportions of Latino residents and citizens are no more 
or less likely to propose legislation, whether restrictive or pro-immigrant.  
 
Instead, we find that political factors not commonly cited by proponents of state and local 
immigration laws are more important. 31  Importantly, 67 percent of cities with restrictive 
ordinances are in Republican-majority counties. Although we do not have finer-grain data on 
partisanship for all localities in the United States, we were able to obtain such data on places 
with restrictive ordinances.
32
 Here, too, we find that a high proportion of restrictive ordinances 
(77%) have passed in Republican-majority cities. And, partisanship has, by far, the strongest 
relationship at the state level. At the state level, nearly two-thirds of restrictive states had a 
                                                        
29
 We report findings based on the partisanship of electorates in order to provide a comparable basis of comparison 
to our local partisanship measures. The results on partisanship are similar when using measures of party control of 
the state legislature. 
30
 We utilize a resource available via Findlaw that summarizes current state-level policies and code it on the same 
restrictive to permissive scale (low to high) as in our analysis of enacted legislation in the 2005-2007 period. State 
Immigration Laws, FINDLAW, http://immigration.findlaw.com/immigration-laws-and-resources/state-immigration-
laws/. Data is current as of December 31, 2011. 
31
 The partisan composition of the area plays an important role, second only to city size. However, because city size 
is positively associated with both pro and restrictive ordinances, party composition is the only factor that displays 
statistically significant and theoretically consistent effects (negative on the restrictive side and positive on the pro 
side).  
32
 Local party registration data for localities obtained from the voter statistics firm Aristotle, Inc. 
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Republican majority of voters during this time period, and for those who have passed major 
pieces of restrictive legislation on enforcement and employer verification, the proportion of 
Republican-majority states is much higher (94%).
33
 
 
Thus, our fundamental conclusion on partisanship and subfederal immigration regulation 
leads to three important questions: (1) Why is partisanship at the subnational level relevant to 
legislation on immigration? (2) How is partisanship utilized to enact immigration laws in places 
where demographic pressures are inconsequential? and (3) Who is utilizing and mobilizing the 
partisanship dynamic to achieve these legislative goals? Due to space constraints, we limit the 
discussion here of the political dynamics that help explain these statistical findings, saving a 
larger exploration for our book project,34 but we sketch some brief answers to these questions 
below.  
 
 First, there is ample survey evidence to indicate that Republican voters, and especially 
those who are active in party primaries, care intensely about immigration and hold restrictive 
views on the matter.35 When this pattern in public opinion gets harnessed through the primary 
process, Republican-heavy areas have enabled primary challengers to mobilize against 
incumbents on the immigration issue. Republican incumbents, in turn, have either been defeated 
by more restrictivist challengers, or they have themselves taken more conservative positions on 
immigration to avoid primary defeat.
36
  
 
Even in many cities where elected offices are often nonpartisan, contexts of local 
partisanship nevertheless continue to matter, as policy activists find it easier to promote 
restrictive legislation on immigration in Republican-heavy areas. For example, in 2010, the Los 
Angeles Times reported on the successful attempts of a local Tea Party activist in getting 
Republican-dominant cities in Southern California, such as Temecula and Murrieta, to pass 
restrictive measures, after failing to do the same in larger, politically diverse cities, such as 
Riverside and Ontario.37 Even though city councils in California are nonpartisan bodies, the 
proportion of Republican voters in these cities nevertheless still matters for interest 
representation. Thus, even for nonpartisan elections and governmental bodies, Republican Party 
registration still signals the potential opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to promote restrictive 
legislation. 
 
                                                        
33
 This compares to 57% of states with a Republican majority of voters in 2004. 
34
 Karthick Ramakrishnan and Pratheepan Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, 
ARIZ. ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2012). 
35
 Frank Newport, Republicans Prioritize Immigration; Dems, Financial Reform, GALLUP, (April 30, 2010), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/127607/republicans-prioritize-immigration-dems-financial-reform.aspx; Lymari 
Morales, Americans' Immigration Concerns Linger, GALLUP, (January 17, 2012), 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/152072/Americans-Immigration-Concerns-Linger.aspx.  
36
 This was evident in Arizona as far back as 2004 and 2006, as long-standing Republican incumbents such as 
Congressman Jim Kolbe faced competitive primary elections by challengers focusing on immigration and border-
control issues. See Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006 (Magazine), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/10/15/magazine/15immigration.html.  
37
 Phil Willon, Conservative Inland Empire Cities Crack Down on Illegal Workers, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2011, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2011/feb/14/local/la-me-0212-e-verify-20110214.  
 13 
 
Second, political dynamics at the subnational level on immigration are also tied to 
political dynamics at the national level. This is particularly true in the case of restrictive local 
policies on immigration, where activist groups such as the Federation for American Immigration 
Reform (FAIR) and NumbersUSA have sought to stall moderate legislation at the federal level 
that includes some form of legalization, while at the same time fomenting restrictionist 
legislation at the state and local level. Rather than hoping or waiting for federal legislative efforts 
at bipartisan immigration reform to stall, since 2004 these organizations have pursued a dual 
strategy: They purposefully promote legislative gridlock at the federal level, and then cite the 
very national legislative inaction they helped foment to justify restrictive solutions at the local 
level.38  
 
Finally, since 2006, the work of proliferating legislation at the subnational level has 
found its strongest champion in Kris Kobach, a former law professor who has served as legal 
counsel for many states and localities that have passed restrictive legislation, both in an 
individual capacity and as an employee of the Immigration Reform Law Institute (IRLI), the 
legal branch of the restrictive group FAIR. Not only has Kobach provided legal counsel for cities 
such as Hazleton, PA and Farmers Branch, TX, he has also played a pivotal role in the crafting 
of legislation in many of the same jurisdictions, including cities like Hazleton, and states such as 
Arizona and Alabama. 39  Thus, while restrictive policies may have local sponsors in each 
jurisdiction, the evidence we have analyzed from a variety of news reporting reveals a 
nationally-involved group of actors (who we term “restrictive issue entrepreneurs”) who are 
advancing—through political rhetoric, legal justification, and the design and promotion of 
legislation—a proliferation of subnational policies aimed at “attrition through enforcement,” or 
making living and employment conditions so inhospitable to unauthorized immigrants as to 
encourage their departure.40  
 
                                                        
38
 Our article, Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, ARIZ. 
ST. L. J. (forthcoming 2012), details the legislative involvement of FAIR and NumbersUSA. In 2004, while FAIR 
was striving to push back against legalization efforts in Washington D.C. following calls for comprehensive 
immigration reform by George W. Bush and John McCain, it also gave financial backing to Arizona’s Proposition 
200 campaign, a measure modeled after California’s Proposition 187 that sought to deny unauthorized immigrants 
access to many public benefits. Steven Wall, Efforts Against Illegal Immigrants Rise, SAN BERNARDINO SUN, Nov. 
9, 2004. Indeed, pro-immigrant advocacy organizations in Washington D.C. saw FAIR’s foray into Arizona as 
connected to its D.C.-based legislative strategy, as it sought to push back against moderate legislation being offered 
by Arizona’s Congressmen Jim Kolbe, Jeff Flake, and Senator John McCain. Interview with immigration advocacy 
organization (Apr. 12, 2012); see also Jim Behnke The Tres Amigos - Kolbe, Flake, McCain, SIERRA VISTA HERALD 
REVIEW, January 8, 2004. 
39
 George Talbot, Kris Kobach, the Kansas Lawyer Behind Alabama’s Immigration Law, PRESS-REGISTER (Mobile, 
AL), October 16, 2011. 
40
 NUMBERSUSA, How Attrition Through Enforcement Works (noting that immigration raids would be unnecessary 
if federal, state, and local enforcement effectively make “living illegally … more difficult and less satisfying over 
time”), https://www.numbersusa.com/content/learn/issues/american-workers/how-attrition-through-enforcement-
works.html. See also Michael Williamson, Self-Deportation Proponents Kris Kobach, Michael Hethmon Facing 
Time of Trial, WASH. POST, April 24, 2012 (quoting an Oklahoma representative who notes that Kobach and his 
partner at IRLI, Michael Hethmon “were the face and the muscle behind the effort that really synthesized it into a 
movement. Do I think it would have happened without them? Most certainly it would not have.”), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/time-of-trial-for-proponents-of-self-
deportation/2012/04/24/gIQAe6lheT_story.html. 
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While it is also possible for pro-immigration advocates to pursue a similar strategy—of 
promoting federal gridlock as a fruitful condition for subnational action—our review of news 
coverage and interviews with permissive and restrictive organizations in Washington, D.C., 
shows that pro-immigrant organizations still push for federal solutions as optimal policy, 
particularly on matters pertaining to immigration enforcement.41 Accordingly, the integrationist 
strategy has focused on Congress enacting comprehensive immigration reforms that they hope 
will include DREAM Act provisions and other pathways to legalization. Meanwhile, pro-
immigrant efforts on matters such as sanctuary city policies and in-state tuition for 
undocumented students are driven mostly by local sponsorship, with little coordination in 
activity. 42  By contrast, restrictive proposals often feature local sponsors and national 
organizations and issue entrepreneurs, with model legislation that is replicated across 
jurisdictions.43  Importantly, the main national organizations promoting the spread of restrictive 
local measures (NumbersUSA and FAIR) are the same ones who also have played a prominent 
role over the past two decades in derailing congressional efforts on immigrant legalization, 
keeping viable a plausible case for local action.44  
 
Thus, while local contexts of partisanship matter on both the restrictive and pro-
immigrant sides of local legislation, the dynamics that produce them are more local in the case of 
permissive policies, while federated and coordinated with national organizations in the case of 
restrictive legislation. As we discuss in the next section, these differences may have some 
significant implications for considerations of federalism, including the relevance of 
functionalism, availability cascades, and party federation in producing this subnational variation 
in immigration policies.  
 
III. Implications for Immigration Federalism 
 
As our empirical investigation shows, in subnational immigration regulation, 
demography is not dispositive. By in large, subnational regulations are not organic responses to 
demographic change, brought on by intractable public policy challenges. Instead, our data and 
analysis suggest that interested policy actors present pre-made solutions to politically receptive 
jurisdictions, regardless of the underlying demographic pressures in those jurisdictions. This 
conclusion challenges existing theories and assumptions regarding the rise, proliferation, and 
utility of subnational immigration regulations. 45  Specifically, we draw a contrast with 
“functionalist” theories of state and local action that assume the salience of demographic-change 
                                                        
41
 We note here that this could also be influenced by the different legal analysis (federalism, preemption) applicable 
to pro-immigrant state and local ordinances (which often do not mention citizenship status at all), in contrast to the 
legal analysis of enforcement-type state and local provisions (which use immigration status as a trigger). 
42
 Interview with Angela Kelley, Center for American Progress (2011); Interview with Frank Sharry, America’s 
Voice (2012); Interview with Clarissa Martinez, NCLR (2012). 
43
 For more details, see our book Pratheepan Gulasekaram and Karthick Ramakrishnan, Immigration Federalism: Its 
Political Underpinnings and Legal Implications (unpublished manuscript). See also Ian Gordon, How Did Harsh 
Immigration Laws Spread to Your Statehouse, MOTHER JONES, March/April 2012; MODEL LEGISLATION, 
IMMIGRATION REFORM LAW INSTITUTE, www.irli.org/laws (last visited Oct. 11, 2012). 
44
 See Ramakrishnan and Gulasekaram, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, supra note 34. 
45
 An in-depth exploration of the theoretical and constitutional implications of our empirical investigation is featured 
in Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The New Immigration Federalism (forthcoming 2013) (draft on file with 
authors). 
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for policy expression, and with “steam-valve” theories, which suggest that state and local 
restrictionist policies relieve pressure on national restrictionist efforts. Finally, we query the 
significance of our empirical conclusions for judicial evaluations of subfederal immigration laws. 
 
The fact that partisanship matters more than any other factor suggests that, above all else, 
subnational immigration policy expression reflects naked political preference and opportunistic 
use of party polarization.
46
 This conclusion contradicts the assumptions made by scholars who 
have argued that what is “missing” from debates over the constitutionality of subfederal 
enactments is “a functional account that explains why state and local measures have arisen over 
the past five to ten years, and how this reality on the ground should reshape our conceptual and 
doctrinal understandings of immigration regulation.”47 Professor Cristina Rodriguez is correct 
that purely legal, constitutional debates over subfederal involvement in immigration – focusing 
on federalism and preemption questions – miss crucial “on the ground” factors that should 
influence judicial and popular evaluations of these laws. However, the missing reality is not 
necessarily the new demography and geography of immigration; rather it is the new politics of 
immigration.48 
 
The political and partisan dynamics of immigration suggests that the various state and 
local policy instantiations are not the type of policy experimentation imagined by the Supreme 
Court 49  and legal scholars. 50  Our model proposes that restrictive subfederal laws are being 
proliferated and replicated in multiple jurisdictions, not because the legislation presents a unique 
method of addressing an emerging public policy concern, but rather because the political 
conditions are ripe for replication. Thus, the policy “experimentation” and replication currently 
occurring in the immigration field has little demonstrative value to other jurisdictions; 51  it 
changes the terms and tenor of the national debate on immigration, but does not solve the “on the 
ground” problems referenced by Rodriguez. 
 
In addition, “steam-valve” theories of subnational policy proliferation also require 
reconsideration. It is tempting to agree with Professor Peter Spiro’s intuition that leeway for 
isolated, subfederal anti-immigrant regulation relieves pressure to promote the same restrictive 
                                                        
46
 See Supra Part II; see also, Cass Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble, 110 YALE L.J. at 74-6 (2000) (showing how 
limited private information tends to make people follow others, and reach more extreme policy positions). 
47
 Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 4, at 571. 
48
 We hasten to add that functionalist accounts of subfederal legislation may serve the important purpose of carving 
out a normative space for local involvement. It may very well be normatively desirable, as Rodriguez argues, to 
locate and institute integrationist measures at the local level. Further, we agree with Professor Rodriguez’s 
underlying point that uniformity in immigration policy across the nation may not be necessary or normatively 
desirable. Id., at 611. 
49
 New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of 
the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”). 
50
 See Matthew Parlow, A Localist’s Case For Decentralizing Immigration Policy, 84 DENVER U. L. REV. 1061 
(2007); Huntington, Immigration Federalism, supra note 4; Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local, supra note 4 
at 609 (“And perhaps most importantly, local experimentalism will be of tremendous value in this context.”). 
51
 Many of these ordinances, however, do demonstrate the social and economic pitfalls of local regulation. Several 
states have abandoned or reconsidered their enforcement-heavy approaches after enactment, and after experiencing 
the consequences of such laws. 
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policies as federal legislation.
52
 Thus, as per his “steam-valve” theory, even if subfederal 
restrictionist measures primarily reflect raw political preference (and not necessary responses to 
pressing policy problems), those measures in isolated localities could serve a normatively 
desirable purpose by providing a relatively contained outlet for anti-immigrant feelings.
53
 
Specifically addressing Arizona’s SB 1070 and the constitutional challenge to the law, Professor 
Spiro argues that “in the long run, immigrant interests will be better helped if the Supreme Court 
upholds S.B. 1070….[If the Court strikes it down], anti-immigrant constituencies will redouble 
their efforts to enact tougher laws at the federal level.”54 
 
The manner in which these subfederal enactments have been proliferated, however, 
indicates that Spiro’s causal story must be reversed: Suppression of subfederal lawmaking does 
not promote effectuation of restrictionist measures at the federal level;
55
 rather, purposeful 
suppression of moderate or compromised federal lawmaking provides the receptive legislative 
backdrop for promotion of extreme measures at the subfederal level. The issue entrepreneurs’ 
goal is to continue proliferation in every jurisdiction that is politically ripe for legislation. Each 
successive enactment builds, rather than dissipates, momentum. Specifically, in the immigration 
context, we suggest that interested policy activists coordinate activity between the local and 
federal levels so that legislative activity at the federal level does not stand as an obstacle to 
further subfederal proliferation.56 In other words, part of the receptive context for continued 
subfederal policy proliferation is the strategic stalling of federal legislative responses, until an 
acceptable de facto national consensus on restrictionist policies can be instituted at the federal 
level. 
 
Finally, our conclusions might have implications for the way courts evaluate state and 
local immigration laws. First, the doctrinal basis for subfederal participation in immigration 
requires that states establish the “vital necessity” of their immigration regulation.57 In Chy Lung v. 
Freeman (1875), the Court found unconstitutional a California law that purported to allow state 
officials to make immigration decisions. In doing so, the Court seemed to leave open the 
possibility that states might constitutionally enact immigration enforcement laws, but only if 
Congress failed to act and it was absolutely necessary for states to protect themselves from 
                                                        
52
 Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1636 (1997) (“Affording 
the states discretion to act on their preferences diminishes the pressure on the structure as a whole; otherwise, 
because you don’t let off the steam, sooner or later the roof comes off.”). 
53
 The limitation has to be defined in terms of the quantity of subfederal jurisdictions; quality-wise, it is difficult to 
suggest that Alabama’s recent immigration law – which has had the effect of driving immigrant children out of 
school – is relatively harmless, even if it occurs only within an individual state. 
54
 Peter J. Spiro, Let Arizona’s Law Stand, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2012, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/opinion/let-the-arizona-law-stand-then-wither.html.  
55
 Id.; Spiro, Learning to Live, supra note 52 at 1630 (“One must look to the consequence of such suppression and 
the possibility that frustrated state preferences may actually prompt the effectuation of anti-alien measures at the 
federal level.”). 
56
 See Gulasekaram and Ramakrishnan, The Importance of the Political in Immigration Federalism, ARIZ. ST. L. J. 
(forthcoming 2012) (using qualitative empirical data to show the highly networked and coordinated work of 
immigration issue entrepreneurs at the federal and subfederal levels). 
57
 Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875). 
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paupers and criminals. 58  Leaving aside whether Congress’ recent failures to pass federal 
immigration law constitute the inaction described in Chy Lung, our conclusion undermines the 
narrative of necessity foregrounded in the purpose statements of the several state and local 
immigration laws at issue. By extension then, our analysis casts doubt on judicial opinions that 
rely on these unsubstantiated claims of state need. While any single jurisdiction might face 
objectively measurable policy challenges related to immigration, systemic claims of immigrant-
induced problems cannot be substantiated.  
 
Moreover, when enacting jurisdictions are selected because of their partisan composition 
(and not their demographic conditions), state and local immigration policy proliferation fails to 
achieve most federalism values. Traditional federalism theory suggests some constitutional 
leeway might be justified for subfederal policy experimentation that attempts to address 
regionally-specific concerns. However, as we have shown, demographic change and its attendant 
policy problems are not common to enacting jurisdictions. Therefore, any replication of 
subfederal immigration policies does not represent the type of useful policy experimentation 
imagined in traditional federalism theory. Indeed, restrictionist advocacy groups produce pre-
packaged immigration legislation that restrictionist issue entrepreneurs shop to receptive 
jurisdictions, regardless of whether that legislation responds to policy challenges within the 
jurisdiction. In short, the current spate of state and local immigration laws are an example of 
solutions to imagined problems; these jurisdictions are not Justice Brandeis’ idealized 
“laboratories of policy experimentation.” 
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
Ultimately, Justice Scalia’s indignation about Arizona’s inability to defend itself from 
“bearing the brunt of the country’s illegal immigration problem” is a rhetorically compelling 
story, but one that lacks empirical support. Unintentionally, however, his foray into an extra-
judicial, political missive against the Administration’s prosecutorial priorities sheds a spotlight 
on the genesis and essence of the current trend of restrictionist state immigration laws. These 
laws do not arise naturally out of economic or social necessity; instead they largely are the 
products of political opportunism. In the end, Scalia’s dissent showcases why untested 
assumptions about undocumented immigrants are so dangerous. They help form the basis of 
impossible theories of the Union, whereby every state possesses the inherent power to expel 
inhabitants; they change the constitutional conversation about state immigration regulation, 
building an unsubstantiated empirical case for the necessity of state intervention; and finally, 
they obscure the highly partisan, well-organized mechanism at work in the creation of these 
restrictive laws. 
 
 The continuing importance of national immigration legislation was evident once again 
during President Obama’s victory speech on the eve of his re-election in November 2012.  In the 
speech, Obama spoke of “fixing our immigration system” as one of four important policy 
                                                        
58
 Id. (“We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a state, in the absence of legislation 
by Congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws against paupers and convicted criminals from 
abroad….Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise, and cannot be carried beyond the scope 
of that necessity.”). 
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priorities for his second term. 59  The same week, news outlets ran front-page stories with 
Republican strategists signaling a desire to pass immigration reform to improve their party’s 
standing among Latinos.60 Despite this seeming optimism, the party dynamics we uncovered will 
make such national legislative change difficult to achieve.  Because immigration politics over the 
past decade has become victim to intense party polarization, very few, if any, moderate 
Republicans remain to create bipartisan reform.  Further, as we have noted, the dynamics of our 
federalist system incentivize members of Congress to heed the more extreme nationalistic and 
xenophobic views of their state and local party compatriots.  Finally, even if there is modest 
bipartisan support for measures such as immigrant legalization, it remains to be seen whether 
Congress will be able to design legislation that “wipes the slate clean” on state and local 
immigration laws, invalidating existing ones and preempting the growth of future subfederal 
legislation on immigration.  Without such preemptive legislation, it is likely that the network of 
restrictive issue entrepreneurs will continue their efforts to proliferate legislation at the 
subfederal level. 
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